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Seeking “strategic alternatives” is jargon for exploring the potential sale or merger of the 
company in the precursory mergers and acquisitions (M&A) setting. Whether to pursue strategic 
alternatives is one of the most disruptive corporate decisions a company faces in its lifetime, since the 
firm that seeks strategic alternatives is calling into question its future existence as a stand-alone entity. 
As the transactional landscape moves away from hostile takeovers that dominated the 1980’s and earlier 
decades and towards predominately friendly takeovers in the 1990’s and beyond, it is increasingly 
important to understand the motives behind this category of takeovers, where the selling side is amenable 
to being sold. This study focuses on the sell-side and seeks to illuminate, first, why firms set out to 
explore strategic alternatives, by characterizing the attributes of firms that are volitionally seeking their 
own sale. The analyses naturally lead to additionally documenting what attributes make target firms 
desirable to bidders, by examining the characteristics of firms that actually receive bids from the sample 
of self-selected potential target firms. While the “supply” of selling firms is inherently distinct from the 
ex-post targets demanded by bidders, prior papers have not been able to distinguish between the two. 
This paper aims to rectify this limitation. 
A review of strategic alternatives is the catalyst to the sale process, yet this event has been largely 
overlooked by M&A researchers. In this process, the company’s directors and executives consider and 
evaluate a possible sale or merger of the company; members of the company board may form a Special 
Committee to discuss whether it is an appropriate time to seek potential buyers and what a third party 
may be willing to pay for the company. The senior management and the Special Committee retain an 
investment bank as the financial adviser, who contacts third parties to gauge their interest in a potential 
acquisition. The company seeking strategic alternatives may enter into separate confidentiality 
agreements with potential acquirers, and provide confidential and non-confidential company 
information to them in the course of due diligence. Some firms’ strategic reviews will result in bids 
while other firms’ reviews will not. 
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In this amorphously defined sale process, I observe which firms are exploring strategic 
alternatives (identified by corporate disclosures and media leaks) and which firms become actual targets 
(identified by the receipt of merger bids). To the extent that I do not observe all the firms seeking 
strategic alternatives or all the firms receiving bids, the respective empirical results would be 
understated. 
Understanding target takeover motives and common attributes of target firms is a key component 
to understanding why takeovers occur from the target firm’s perspective, and this topic is relevant to 
managers and directors, investors, and sell-side and buy-side advisers. Takeovers can occur for many 
reasons, such as being driven by the stock market or by rational efficiency, behavioral biases, or agency 
problems of acquirers.1 However, from the target firm’s perspective, conventional wisdom 
predominantly supports the value-maximizing, efficiency explanation of takeovers, also known as the 
“q-theory” or “inefficient management” hypothesis. According to economic theory, acquirers choose as 
targets the relatively undervalued and underperforming firms that are in need of a major restructuring of 
corporate assets and an overhaul of inefficient management. The acquirer takes control to discipline or 
replace the inefficient managers who have mismanaged the firm’s assets and caused the firm to be 
undervalued (Jensen, 1986, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).  
Despite the theoretical literature, empirical evidence has not come to a consensus about the 
typical profile of a target firm (e.g., Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008). Even 
if prior papers do come to a consensus about the antecedent characteristics of target firms, it has been 
impossible to infer target firms’ takeover motives, due to confounding effects of bidders’ selection and 
shareholder and regulatory approval tainting the sample. An analogous sample and research design flaw 
is akin to inferring the determinants of targets receiving bids using targets of completed transactions.2 
                                                          
1 There are other purported determinants of takeovers due to the acquiring firm’s agency problems, such as excess cash 
flow, managerial hubris, and empire building. However, this paper focuses on the target’s, not acquirer’s, determinants 
of takeover activity.  
2 Wong and O’Sullivan (2001) review the reasons these two events are not equivocal. 
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Moreover, the guiding economic theories of mergers require an acquirer to do the disciplining or exploit 
the synergies, which leaves no clear interpretation for what the target firm’s motives are for entering the 
M&A sale process before an acquirer materializes. 
A sample of potential target firms that are seeking strategic alternatives—before they become 
actual targets—is a cleaner setting to uncover the targets’ pure motives for M&A, before bidders come 
into the picture and before shareholder approval and regulatory approval bias the sample selection. In 
my setting, firms self-identify that they are amenable to a possible takeover and henceforth become 
potential target firms. The first set of analyses models the selling firms’ self-selection to explore their 
own sale or merger, and identifies the fundamental, market, managerial, and ownership characteristics 
that, on average, influence this decision.  
The unanswered question of why firms seek to be taken over is further motivated by anecdotal 
evidence, which piques our interest with a spectrum of possible target motives. For example, firms may 
seek strategic alternatives when they are facing financial constraints and their valuations have reached a 
bottom. In October 2014, The Financial Times leaked that Angie’s List was exploring strategic options, 
including the possible sale of the business (Appendix 1, Panel A). Angie’s List had just restructured its 
debt and its shares were trading at its 52-week low. In contrast, firms in a growth state and high 
performance may also seek to sell themselves to an acquirer with resources to sustain the growth and 
performance. In October 2014, Conn’s announced that it was exploring strategic alternatives, including 
the possible sale of the company (Appendix 1, Panel B). Conn's grew same-store sales and diluted EPS 
for fiscal 2014 by +26.5 percent and +62.8 percent, respectively. However, its credit-financing business 
struggled due to increased delinquencies and deteriorating credit scores. Therefore, an empirical 
approach can characterize what the typical firm seeking strategic alternatives looks like, with respect to 




I observe firms that seek strategic alternatives and voluntarily announce it through corporate 
disclosures and I also observe firms that intended to shop themselves privately yet were involuntarily 
leaked by the media. Additional insight can be gained about the different types of firms that utilize each 
of these two information channels. Firms that announce strategic alternatives using corporate disclosures 
are likely to be smaller firms with lower analyst coverage and experiencing curtailments. Their managers 
appear over-optimistic and inaccurate, and their incentives are aligned in the short-term, but not long-
term, horizon (i.e., more likely to have golden parachutes, but less insider ownership). In contrast, firms 
with leaked strategic alternatives are distinguished from their peer firms by having higher valuations, 
greater operating cash flows, and greater analyst coverage. These findings imply that less visible firms 
with less able managers choose to announce strategic alternatives in response to declining stock prices 
and operations, whereas firms with greater visibility are more likely to have their strategic reviews 
leaked by the media.   
I interpret the common attributes across both information channels as the firm determinants that 
reveal why target firms are motivated to sell themselves. Results reveal significant differences between 
firms that seek strategic alternatives and their industry-year peers. On average, firms seeking strategic 
alternatives have worse financial condition and worse performance (higher leverage, lower liquidity, 
lower revenues, lower prior returns, and lower EPS growth forecasts) than their industry-year peers. 
However, they have higher blockholder ownership and a higher incidence of golden parachute 
provisions, which may help monitor and align incentives of managers and directors so that they may 
maximize shareholder value through strategic alternatives. The self-selection process can be interpreted 
as: firms with financial and operational problems are desperate for a strategic solution, and in addition, 
monitoring by blockholders and the presence of short-term financial incentives can prompt the managers 
and directors to take action. 
A question that naturally follows is, what attributes distinguish firms that actually receive bids? 
The sample of firms seeking strategic alternatives serves as a known supply of potential target firms, 
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which also allows a cleaner setting to model the bidders’ selection of actual targets, thus revealing the 
desirable firm attributes demanded by bidders.3 In light of the financially and operationally unhealthy 
nature of firms seeking strategic alternatives, an element of perceived growth potential and increasing 
investment needs may attract an acquirer that can provide value to the selling company’s stockholders; 
otherwise, the potential target firm could undergo bankruptcy or recapitalization rather than a merger or 
acquisition. From those firms that are knowingly “on the block,” 44 percent receive at least one merger 
bid within one year, and 51 percent receive at least one bid within two years. The probability of receiving 
a bid is increasing in perceived growth prospects, operating performance, and blockholder ownership, 
and decreasing in market risk – attributes that are plausibly desirable to an acquirer. 
The striking takeaway that’s only possible by modeling the two selection processes separately 
(the targets’ self-selection and the bidders’ selection) is that while firms seeking strategic alternatives 
appear to be low types (based on fundamentals, market prices, and analyst expectations), those that 
actually end up with bids are the relatively better picks in the barrel. In contrast to the inefficient target 
management hypothesis of mergers, which predicts that bidders choose to acquire underperforming 
firms, I find that bidders try to acquire firms with greater opportunities, better operations, and lower 
market risk. This conclusion can be plausibly reconciled to earlier papers because the incidence of hostile 
acquisitions (which would discipline inefficient target managers) is rare in my post-1990 sample period 
(Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). Henceforth, I suggest that readers interested in the M&A sale 
process could update their prior expectations of how the selection process works with these findings 
from a more recent time period. In the post-1990 period when transactions are overwhelmingly friendly, 
the operationally- and financially-challenged sellers appear to start disciplining themselves, and bidders 
                                                          
3 This characterization of the target’s sale process does not apply to hostile takeovers. The generalizability of this study 
is not hindered because hostile takeovers are rare in the post-1990 sample period used in this study. Andrade, Mitchell, 
and Stafford (2001) find that merely 4 percent of transactions in the 1990’s were hostile. 
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do not prefer to pick the relatively poorly-run, undervalued or mismanaged targets—rather, I find 
evidence to the contrary. 
Finally, this paper provides evidence on the role of corporate governance as an important factor 
in the preliminary M&A sale process. The presence of golden parachute provisions appears to prompt 
managers and directors to seek a sale of their company, but parachutes do not appear to be an influential 
factor in the probability of receiving a bid. The presence of institutional blockholders, however, appears 
to be positively influential at both stages. This finding is consistent with blockholders active monitoring 
directors and managers, and bidders’ preference for targets with better corporate governance (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the research questions and 
highlights the contributions of this paper. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction. Section 
4 describes the research design and empirical measures. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Research Questions and Contribution 
Bolstered by much empirical work before and during the 1980’s, M&A researchers 
conventionally view takeovers as a control device or as a mechanism to achieve synergies between two 
combining firms. Under the control perspective, takeovers are disciplining mechanisms to monitor the 
firm’s management team and replace it when necessary, when other corporate governance mechanisms, 
like the board of directors, fail (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Takeovers lead to the 
replacement of managers whom the board is unable or unwilling to discipline. This disciplining theory 
for M&A predicts that targets are undervalued and underperforming companies, due to industry-wide 
problems or firm-specific problems. Firms in more difficult external operating environments are 
expected to become M&A targets.4 Although the disciplining theory does not distinguish between 
                                                          
4 Pastena and Ruland (1986) and Amit, Livnat, and Zarowin (1989) provide evidence of firms becoming takeover targets 
in order to avoid the costlier alternative of bankruptcy. The empirical implications of the bankruptcy hypothesis are 
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whether such firms voluntarily seek to become M&A targets or are involuntarily targeted by hostile 
bidders, the consensus from empirical research is the latter (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). In 
contrast, this paper provides novel evidence that firms facing financial and operational difficulties appear 
to “self-discipline” (with corporate governance monitoring and aligned incentives) by voluntarily 
reviewing strategic alternatives. 
The relevant literature is comprised of empirical papers that examine the financial, investor, and 
governance characteristics of actual takeover targets (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Ravenscraft 
and Scherer, 1987; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989; Powell, 1997; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). These 
prior empirical papers test possible target motives by identifying differences between actual target firms 
and non-target firms. Despite the generally-accepted prediction that targets are underperforming and 
undervalued firms, empirical studies come up with mixed findings. Furthermore, for any empirically 
significant target firm attribute, do firms seeking to sell themselves display that attribute, or do bidders 
select for that attribute? The paper addresses two related research questions to provide new insight to 
this debate. 
Research question 1: Why do firms seek strategic alternatives (by examining the determinants of firms 
that seek strategic alternatives, compared to their industry-year peers)? 
Research question 2: Why do certain firms receive bids while others do not (by examining the 
determinants of firms that receive a bid, compared to those that seek to sell themselves but do not receive 
a bid)? 
The main contribution of this paper to existing literature is two-fold. A sample limitation of the 
prior research is that they do not observe firms that attempt to initiate a sale but were not met with 
interest from bidders, nor do they observe targets of bids that were not successful. The prior studies’ 
samples are based on target firms that received bids or targets that were actually acquired, which likely 
                                                          
indistinguishable from the target inefficiency theory; target firms have higher financial leverage than the general 
population of firms. 
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includes ex-post sample selection bias. The first contribution of this paper is to address this issue by 
using a novel dataset of firms that are exploring strategic alternatives, which includes even those do not 
receive bids and therefore are not acquired. This is a plausibly cleaner setting that can inform us about 
target motives, before selection by bidders, shareholder approval, and regulatory approval come into 
play. Moreover, prior studies treat the two selection processes (seeking strategic alternatives and being 
an acquisition target) as one amalgamated process, which presents a problem in empirical studies 
modeling target selection. Therefore, the second contribution of this paper is to model target motives 
and target selection as two selection processes, rather than in one step. 
To see why a cleaner setting and two-step selection model can change our priors, consider the 
following example. Suppose that from the entire population of firms, those with low attribute x will seek 
strategic alternatives. However, bidders prefer and only make offers to targets with relatively high x. 
Although x is a sell-side motive and a distinct attribute of target selection, the association between x and 
being an ex-post observed target may be statistically insignificant or mixed when prior researchers do 
not observe the intermediate sample of firms seeking strategic alternatives. This would cause researchers 
to incorrectly fail to reject the null that x is not an important determinant in target selection. My results 
suggest that the prior literature’s mixed conclusions about the role of target (under)performance could 
potentially be due to this problem. 
Empirical studies of whether targets are underperforming or undervalued firms have produced 
mixed evidence. Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) conclude that target firms are not underperforming firms with 
respect to their prior operating earnings and prior stock returns. Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and 
Megginson (1992) find conflicting results about whether poor prior stock market performance is related 
to the probability of takeover. Hasbrouck (1985) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) provide 
conflicting evidence on whether Tobin’s Q is negatively related or not related to the likelihood of 
takeover. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, 1989) analyze 40 target firms that were acquired in hostile 
acquisitions and 34 in friendly acquisitions. Their multiple regressions show that only hostile targets, 
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not friendly targets, have lower Tobin’s Q, abnormal stock returns, and employee growth. “Targets of 
friendly acquisitions have Tobin’s Q comparable to that of nontargets… Friendly targets are…basically 
indistinguishable from the sample as a whole [Fortune 500 firms] in terms of performance variables” 
(p.103). Their evidence suggests that the acquirer disciplines underperforming, badly-managed target 
firms using hostile acquisitions, whereas the willing targets of friendly acquisitions do not appear to be 
distinguished by poor performance. In contrast, my evidence suggests that unhealthy firms seeking 
strategic alternatives are willing to become takeover targets. Since I also document that bidders select 
targets that are relatively healthier, prior empirical papers may have muddled the two confounding 
effects when examining targets of friendly transactions. 
With respect to other firm characteristics, prior papers have found that targets are smaller 
(Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Morck, et al., 1988; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997; 
Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian, 2011), have lower liquidity (Powell) or higher liquidity (Hasbrouck), 
lower growth (Palepu), higher leverage (Powell), higher free cash flow (Powell), and a higher portion 
of tangible fixed assets to total assets (Ambrose and Megginson). 
Note, however, that even though prior studies use ex-post target samples, they vary in their 
definition of the target firms (i.e., targets that receive bids or targets of completed transactions?) and 
vary in their choice of a comparison sample; see Exhibit 1. Prior papers partitioning on deal 
characteristics have compared acquired targets of friendly deals against acquired targets of hostile deals 
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988, 1989). Papers have also compared acquired targets in target-
initiated deals against acquired targets in acquirer-initiated deals (Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2010; 
Fidrmuc and Xia, 2017).5 While initiating the sale of the firm and exploring strategic alternatives both 
reflect a firm’s willingness to sell itself, the prior studies do not observe firms that seek strategic 
                                                          
5 Aktas, et al. (2010) examine the determinants of target-initiated deals using a sample of completed M&A transactions. 
They find that firms with lower Tobin’s Q, lower institutional ownership, and higher institutional shareholding 
concentration are more likely to initiate their own sale compared to targets of completed deals initiated by the acquirer. 
Return-on-assets and sales growth are not associated with the probability of target deal initiation. 
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alternatives but do not receive a bid and become acquired, which introduces sample bias. Omitted firms 
could have displayed legitimate target motives but they do not appear in a sample of targets using only 
completed acquisitions.  
In general, because prior research only considers the takeover process as it evolves from the 
initial bid to deal completion, there is no extant analysis about firms that seek to sell themselves and 
those that succeed versus fail at obtaining an offer.6 Once a firm has started reviewing strategic 
alternatives, it is unclear whether it will continue on the M&A sale process and whether or not it receives 
an offer from an interested buyer. If a firm does not proceed with the sale process, it could attempt to 
increase shareholder value as a stand-alone entity and/or through more painful alternatives such as 
restructuring, selling off assets, laying off employees, and reducing wages. Yet, no paper has yet 
examined why some selling firms fail to receive a bid. Some papers use a sample of target firms who received 
bids and compare the firm attributes of those in completed versus failed deals.7  
Additional contributions of this paper include providing evidence on the role of corporate 
governance in firms attempting to salvage firm value with strategic alternatives, and distinguishing 
between the firms that transmit strategic alternatives information via corporate disclosures versus media 
leaks. My findings are consistent with large institutional owners actively monitoring firm performance 
under classical theory (Edmans, 2014) by prompting the evaluation of strategic alternatives and 
blockholder ownership being a desirable trait. However, I do not find evidence that firms seeking 
strategic alternatives nor those that receive bids have greater activist ownership compared to their peers, 
which fails to support the role of activists as catalysts for M&A (Brav, et al., 2008). The presence of 
                                                          
6 Zha Giedt (2017) provides the only extant empirical description of firms seeking strategic alternatives, but that paper 
focuses on the future economic outcomes following the announcement of strategic alternatives, rather than the 
antecedent determinants. Boone and Mulherin (2007, 2008) mention strategic alternatives in their description of the sale 
process, but they do not use any empirical constructs or tests based on strategic alternatives data. 
7 Asquith (1983) finds that the cumulative excess returns (days -480 to -5) of successful target firms are lower than those 
of unsuccessful target firms, though both groups of targets experience negative prior returns. In contrast, Malmendier, 
Opp, and Saidi (2016) find that the mean target firm’s Tobin’s q is weakly higher in completed deals than in failed 
deals. De Bodt, Cousin, and Demidova (2014) and Marquardt and Zur (2015) also characterize the targets of completed 
deals relative to those of failed deals. See Exhibit 1. 
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golden parachutes, while often viewed unfavorably as a proxy for managerial entrenchment, appears to 
be a favorable governance mechanism to neutralize the job loss disutility of managers and directors 
when they put the firm up for sale. 
Finally, the differing determinants of firms voluntarily disclosing strategic alternatives versus 
firms leaked by the media (i.e., involuntary disclosure) highlight the characteristics of firms and their 
information environment that predispose some to take control of their company news versus getting 
leaked. My findings suggest that firms with low visibility in the market may seek to proactively 
disseminate news themselves (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999), whereas firms with more robust 
information intermediaries and visibility in the market experience involuntary news dissemination. 
3. Data and Sample Construction 
This study uses a unique hand-collected sample of firms seeking strategic alternatives during 
1990 to 2014. I search on DirectEdgar for 8-K Filings and on Factiva for media leaks and press releases. 
Factiva’s news sources include The Financial Times, The New York Times, Dow Jones Institutional 
News, Business Wire, PR Newswire, The New York Post, The Wall Street Journal, The American 
Banker, The Fly on the Wall, Bloomberg, The Boston Globe, Market Watch and Reuters News. I search 
for various combinations of the following key words and phrases (where * represents a wildcard): 
review*, assess*, evaluat*, consider*, strategic, alternatives, options, sale of the company, merger of the 
company, retained, engaged, advisor, special committee, board, maximize, enhance, shareholder, 
stockholder, value. I also review observations from SDC of target firms that are “seeking a buyer” after 
verifying the related 8-K Filing, media leak, or press release. I review each article to exclude search 
results that are false positives: announcements of a bid, announcements of a definitive agreement, 
announcements where only a division or limited assets are up for sale, and announcements of fire sales 
during bankruptcy proceedings. See Appendix 1 for two examples of firms seeking strategic alternatives 
in my sample; Panel A is a media leak, and Panel B is a voluntary corporate disclosure.  
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Table 1 shows that, after requiring non-missing key variables, my sample consists of 1,006 
corporate disclosures (SA_DISC=1) and 151 media leaks (SA_LEAK=1) from 1990 to 2014. 20 firms 
that disclosed their strategic reviews after media leaks are only counted once, resulting in 1,137 total 
strategic alternatives observations (SA=1). To the extent that my manual data collection missed some 
strategic alternatives observations, my results are likely to be understated. 
I require non-missing total assets (ASSETSi,q), market value of equity (MKVALi,q), book-to-
market of equity (BTMi,q), leverage (LEVi,q), cash and equivalents (CASHi,q), change in quarterly 
earnings (ΔEARNi,q) from the same period in the prior year, quarterly cash flows from operations 
(CFOi,q), quarterly cash flows from investing activities (CFIi,q), quarterly operating accruals (ACCi,q), 
prior 12-month market-demeaned returns (RETi,y), and CAPM beta (BETAi,y). I do not require other less 
populated variables to be non-missing in order to maximize my sample size. See Appendix 2 for variable 
definitions and data sources. All variables except returns are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
The strategic alternatives observations are compared with their peer observations taken from the 
same industry-years. When separately comparing the corporate disclosure or media leak subsamples to 
peer firms, respective industry-year subsamples of the peer group are used. No firm appears in the sample 
more than once every four quarters, to avoid the possibility that a firm is categorized as a strategic 
alternatives firm in one quarter and as a comparison peer firm in an adjacent quarter. 
4. Research Design and Antecedent Firm Attributes 
The general research design is straightforward and follows a case-control methodology 
partitioning on the variable of interest. To answer the first research question, I compare firms that 
disclose strategic alternatives (SA_DISC =1) to their industry-year peer firms (SA_DISC =0), and firms 
that seek strategic alternatives and have it leaked by the media (SA_LEAK=1) to their peers (SA_DISC 
=0). Since firm attributes may also impact the mode of information transmission, only the common 
attributes are interpreted as the determinants of seeking strategic alternatives. To answer the second 
research question, I start with the sample of firms that are seeking strategic alternatives (SA=1), and 
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compare firms that subsequently receive bids within one year (BID1YR=1) to those that do not 
(BID1YR=0). 
The claim that the target selection reflects two different selection processes—the self-selection 
driven by the potential target firm’s takeover motives, and the selection of the actual target by the 
bidder—is by no means clean-cut. There is undoubtedly going to be some muddling of the two processes, 
notably when a firm seeks strategic alternatives because it anticipates that it will be a desired target. If 
this were a significant issue, I would likely find the same determinants when modeling the probability 
of seeking strategic alternatives and when modelling the probability of receiving a bid. However, 
because I do not find a common set of determinants that influence both selection processes, the two 
selection processes appear to be distinct. Blockholder ownership is the only variable that is significant 
in both processes. 
In order to analyze multiple facets of firms that seek strategic alternatives and firms that receive 
bids, the variables of interest encompass financial measures of firm condition and performance, market-
based measures of risk ad returns, analyst coverage and expectations, proxies for managerial ability and 
contracting, and ownership structure. These antecedent firm characteristics are all measured using the 
most recent annual, quarterly, or monthly data from a prior period. Univariate analyses allow for the 
maximum number of observations to be used, while multivariate analyses test only the variables that are 
most populated in the data. I explain the variables of interest below. 
4.1 Antecedents: financial condition and performance variables 
The firm’s financial condition is described using size (ASSETS and MKVAL), leverage (LEV), 
and liquidity (CASH and INTAN). The importance of firm size as a firm attribute is straightforward. Prior 
studies observe that targets tend to be smaller firms than non-targets (Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; 
Morck, et al., 1988; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell, 1997; Cornett, et al., 2011). However, it is 
unclear whether smaller, more volatile firms are more likely to find themselves in a situation needing to 
review strategic alternatives, or smaller firms are easier to sell, because a smaller target means less 
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financing for bidders to procure and easier post-transaction integration. Another reason firm size could 
be influential in the M&A sale process is that in larger firms, ownership is more dispersed, leading to a 
free-rider problem because many minor shareholders are unlikely to devote resources to pressure 
management enforce valuation maximization.   
Firms burdened by high levels of debt and low liquidity may be more likely to seek a strategic 
out and monetize shareholder value by getting acquired. The firm’s leverage (LEV) may be an important 
attribute to look at since greater debt pushes the manager to undertake risky but highly profitable actions, 
reflects monitoring by bondholders, and beyond some point, threatens the firm with bankruptcy and 
reorganization costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An extremely high level of debt may lead firms to 
seek a sale as a way to get financial resources from an acquirer and avoid more painful alternatives like 
bankruptcy or restructuring (Pastena and Ruland, 1986; Amit, Livnat, and Zarowin, 1989). On the other 
hand, an extremely low level of debt may signal adverse selection problems, managerial incompetence, 
and hence be associated with takeover likelihood. 
The proportion of assets that are liquid cash (CASH) may be a motive takeover due to the 
‘growth-resource imbalance’ in the target (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997). For example, high growth firms 
with low resources (i.e., low liquidity and high leverage) may be ideal targets for bidders with the 
opposite imbalance (i.e., low growth prospects, but high liquidity and low leverage). In addition, the 
proportion of assets that are intangible (INTAN) provide another view of a firm’s financial condition, 
since firms with high leverage, low cash and cash equivalents, and a high level of intangibles may find 
themselves in a financial bind and thus seek strategic alternatives. 
Several measures of expected and operating performance are used. BTM is the book-to-market 
ratio of common equity. I use the level of BTM, calculated using the most recent quarterly financial 
numbers, to capture investors’ timely evaluation of the firm’s growth prospects. I assume that the book 
value accurately reflects the firm’s net assets, without distortion by extreme accounting choices, and that 
the market value prior to the strategic alternatives disclosure accurately values the firm as a going 
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concern under the current management, rather than the value with a change in control. Financial 
statement-based measures of performance include the change in quarterly earnings from the same quarter 
in the prior year (∆EARN), quarterly sales (REV), cash and accrual components of operating earnings 
(CFO and ACC), and cash flows from investing activities (CFI). CFO and CFI sum to free cash flow; 
Jensen’s (1986) theory of the agency cost of free cash flow posits that managers will waste the firm’s 
free cash flow in perquisites and negative NPV projects rather than return it to shareholders. 
Accordingly, these firms have low performance, low valuations, and are token takeover targets. 
Annual employee growth (EMPGR) is another measure of operating performance. Employee 
growth is closely related to business operations and the health of a company, yet it does not rely on 
financial statement numbers or stock prices like the other performance measures. Furthermore, it reflects 
management’s reaction to past events (i.e., changes in product demand) and assessment for the future 
(i.e., allowing for production increases or curtailments). 
4.2 Antecedents: market, managers, and ownership variables 
Fundamentals alone are unlikely to influence which firms seek strategic alternatives and which 
of those firms receive bids. The next set of variables encompasses the firm’s market (risk, returns, and 
intermediaries), management, and ownership structure. Market beta (BETA) is calculated from the 
standard monthly return series using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Prior 12-month returns (RET, 
market-demeaned) capture the market’s evaluation of the firm’s current and expected future profitability.  
Analysts are a key market intermediary, and their forecasts of EPS growth (EPSFORECAST) 
and the number of analysts following the firm (NUMANALYSTS) are important variables that 
characterize the firm’s future performance and visibility with respect to market intermediaries.  
Managers’ forecast error (MANAGERFE) proxies for the managerial ability of top executives. 
The signed forecast error measures their optimism or overconfidence about the performance of the 
company. The absolute forecast error (|MANAGERFE|) more directly relates to the manager’s precision. 
Firms seeking strategic alternatives may have a low ability or overconfident managers, who led the firm 
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to where it now needs to seek strategic alternatives. Although financial leverage (LEV) is mainly 
interpreted as a measure of financial constraint and to describe capital structure, it may also be a proxy 
for managerial entrenchment, since entrenched managers increase leverage beyond the optimal point to 
inflate the voting power of their equity stakes (Harris and Raviv, 1988).8  
The firm’s ownership structure, comprised of institutional investors, activists, and insiders, may 
influence its strategic decision-making. Under classical governance theory (Edmans, 2014), external 
ownership monitors managers and directors so that they pursue shareholder objectives, like seeking 
strategic alternatives and pushing the firm to actually get acquired. Institutional investors controlling a 
large block of votes and activist hedge funds have been regarded as a monitoring mechanism due to the 
pressure they exert over management (e.g., Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001; Edmans, 2014), but there is 
mixed empirical evidence whether they play an effective role in improving firm performance 
(Holderness, 2003). In the M&A setting, Holmstrom and Kaplan report that institutional investors were 
often the key sellers of larger blocks of shares in takeovers, giving them the ability to facilitate their 
preferred transaction. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that takeovers are more likely to occur as 
shareholder control increases, and Cremers, Nair, and John (2009) and Ali, Kravet, and Li (2016) find a 
positive association between blockholders and takeover likelihood. The two measures of external 
ownership I use are BLOCKHOLDERS and ACTIVIST, which are the percentage of shares outstanding 
owned by institutional blockholders and activists, respectively. Even though activists are subset of 
institutional investors, I measure activist holdings separately because Brav, et al. (2008) find that 
activists are involved in turnaround situations. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), increased managerial ownership aligns the managers’ 
interests with that of shareholders, to maximizing firm value and not squander wealth. Wong and 
O’Sullivan (2001) suggest that incumbent managers' ownership in the firm may influence their 
                                                          
8 In contrast, Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) find that leverage and managerial entrenchment are inversely related. 
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preference for a takeover when personal financial gains from a change in control outweigh the possible 
losses, especially job loss. Other corporate executives and directors may also align their business 
decisions with shareholders’ interests as insider ownership increases. Since the board officially approves 
the decision to seek strategic alternatives, and managers, directors, and partners are all involved in the 
M&A sale process, a broader definition of insiders is appropriate. I measure INSIDER as the percentage 
of shares outstanding owned by the CEO, CFO, Chairman, Vice Chairman, directors, and partners.9 
4.3 Characterizing firms that seek strategic alternatives while controlling for industries and years 
To address the first research question, I compare the values of each attribute of the strategic 
alternatives firms with their peer firms from the same industry-years. It is important to differentiate 
between industry-wide and firm-specific characteristics that motivate a target firm to sell itself, because 
boards respond to industry consolidation trends and firm-specific problems. When deciding to sell the 
company, the board of directors and managers look at the other firms in the same industry to evaluate 
the performance of the company and may seek strategic alternatives when the firm underperforms its 
industry. On the other hand, when the whole industry is performing poorly, the company may be less 
inclined to undertake a strategic review of alternatives if it is not underperforming its industry peers. 
Because the contribution of this paper is to identify the firm-specific antecedents, the research design 
must control for industry and year fixed effects, to absorb broad market developments that influence a 
firm’s decision to seek strategic alternatives and a firm’s probability of receiving a bid. 
The research design to answer the first research question controls for industry-varying and time-
varying capital market developments (e.g. merger waves) by including a proxy for the demand for 
industry consolidation (DEMAND), or by insuring that the makeup of different industries and years are 
not driving the observed differences between the strategic alternatives group and peer group. Peer 
observations (SA_DISC=0 and SA_LEAK=0) are taken from the same FF 48 industry-years as the 
                                                          
9 Role codes in the Thomson Reuters Insiders data are: CEO, CFO, CB, D, P, DO, H, OD, and VC. 
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SA_DISC=1 and SA_LEAK=1 observations, respectively. Then, each peer observation is assigned a 
weight, 0≤wi≤1, so that the proportions of FF 12 industries and years in the comparison peer group are 
the same as in the respective SA group (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013).10,11 Including 
fixed effects and using a comparison peer group comprised of the same industries and years essentially 
differences out potential correlated omitted variables that are fixed for industries and years (e.g., stock 
market driven acquisitions and market conditions that lead to demand for consolidation). 
Figure 1 shows the distributions of industries and years. Panel A shows the similar distributions 
of the industries of the SA=1 strategic alternatives group and SA=0 peer group after weighting. Panel B 
shows the similar distributions of calendar years of the SA=1 group and SA=0 peer group after weighting. 
Similar figures for SA_DISC and SA_LEAK are omitted for the sake of brevity. The same industry and 
year distributions in the case and control groups should mitigate confounding effects of M&A merger 
waves and other industry- and time-varying market conditions (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001). 
In the univariate analyses to address the first research question, mean values of aforementioned 
firm determinants are compared using t-tests: between the SA_DISC=1 observations and their 
SA_DISC=0 peers; and between the SA_LEAK=1 observations and their SA_LEAK=0 peers. 
Following the prior literature on predicting takeover targets, my first probit regression estimates 
the probability of an event indicator variable as a function of the firm’s antecedent characteristics. 
ܵܣ_ܦܫܵܥ௜,௧  ݋ݎ ܵܣ_ܮܧܣܭ௜,௧






+ ߚଵଵ݋ݓ݊݁ݎݏℎ݅݌௜,௠ +  ߝ௜,௧ 
SA_DISC or SA_LEAK is modeled using the antecedent firm determinants described in sections 4.1 and 
4.2. All determinants examined in the univariate analyses are included for multivariate analyses with 
                                                          
10 This method of assigning weights to achieve balance on industry and year composition between two groups is an 
application of entropy balancing. 
11 I use the Fama-French 48 industry classification and years to select the peer firms. While I would ideally use FF 48 
industry and year for fixed effects and entropy balancing as well, my finite sample of 1,006 (SA_DISC), 151 
(SA_LEAK), and 1,137 (SA) leads me to use FF 12 industry and year for fixed effects and entropy balancing. 
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several exceptions. Due to collinearity with other determinants, ln(ASSETS) and CASH are excluded. 
Due to not being statistically significant in univariate analyses, CFI and EMPGR are excluded. Due to 
the limited number of non-missing values, EPSFORECAST, MANAGERFE, PARACHUTE, ACTIVIST, 
and INSIDER are excluded. In one specification, a proxy for demand for M&A targets is included 
(DEMAND), to control for the possibility that managers anticipate industry consolidations which affects 
their decision to seek strategic alternatives.  
4.5 Characterizing firms that receive bids 
The second research question starts with the sample of 1,137 observations that are seeking 
strategic alternatives (SA=1) and investigates what attributes characterize the firms that receive bids. 
Table 1 shows that 44 percent of the self-selected firms receive bids within one year, and 51 percent 
within 2 years. While it is straightforward to assume that M&A offers received within one year after the 
announcement or media leak date are the result of the same strategic alternatives initiative, it is relatively 
less straightforward to attribute the receipt of offers in future years to the same strategic alternatives 
initiative. Firm characteristics measured at the time of the announcement or leak also become stale 
information with time. Therefore, I focus on bids received within one year. The univariate analysis uses 
t-tests to compare firm attributes of observations that subsequently receive bids (BID1YR=1) versus 
those that do not (BID1YR =0). 
In the second probit regression, the probability of receiving a bid (BID1YR) is modeled using 
antecedent firm determinants with the same aforementioned excluded variables. 
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In one specification, a proxy for all other omitted traits that might affect firm value and future outcomes 
is included as the control variable 3DAYRET. The three-day return is measured around the announcement 
or media leak date and captures any omitted or unobservable factors, because the market assesses the 




5.1 Determinants of firms seeking strategic alternatives (Research question 1) 
The starting point of these findings is to acknowledge the heterogeneity in firm attributes and 
that this study characterizes the typical attributes of the typical firm that is seeking strategic alternatives. 
Table 2’s univariate analyses reveal how firms seeking strategic alternatives differ from their peer firms, 
one variable at a time. Firm attributes likely also drive the method of disclosure, and the number of 
voluntary disclosures of strategic alternatives dominate medial leaks in the overall SA sample; thus, 
separate analyses are carried out for SA_DISC and SA_LEAK, and only the common determinants of 
SA_DISC and SA_LEAK are interpreted as the determinants of seeking strategic alternatives. 
I first discuss the results that are unique to SA_DISC or SA_LEAK, which provide evidence about 
why firm news is disseminated through certain information channels. In Panel A, firms voluntarily 
disclosing strategic alternatives (SA_DISC=1) are smaller firms. They have higher BTM, reflecting lower 
opportunities. They are underperforming firms with lower ∆EARN, CFO, and ACC. They have higher 
CFI, which is consistent with lower ACC when firms invest less in net operating assets. They have lower 
analyst following, which is consistent with the use of voluntary disclosure to close the information 
asymmetry gap when other channels like information intermediaries are lacking. Insider ownership is 
also lower, suggesting weaker contracting with managers and directors. This supports the story that the 
lack of aligned incentives led these firms to their current unhealthy state, so now they need to seek 
strategic alternatives. They choose to disclose the news in order to transmit the information in an 
otherwise poor information environment. In this univariate analysis, they do not differ from their peers 
in terms of CAPM beta and activist ownership. 
In Panel B, firms that experienced media leaks of strategic alternatives have higher CFO and 
greater analyst following than their peers, which suggests that firms with greater visibility in the analyst 
community are more likely to have their news leaked. They have lower activist ownership than their 
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peers (weakly significant). They do not differ from their peer firms with respect to ∆EARN, CFO, and 
ACC. 
Taken together, the univariate evidence in Table 2 common to SA_DISC and SA_LEAK shows 
that firms seeking strategic alternatives have higher leverage, greater illiquidity (lower CASH and higher 
INTAN), and lower REV, which is consistent with financial and core operational problems. Their prior 
12-month returns are more negative and analyst EPS growth forecasts are lower, suggesting that the 
market’s, including analysts’, assessment of the firm’s future is dire. However, they have more golden 
parachute provisions and higher blockholder ownership, which suggests that displacing manager’s job 
loss disutility and providing more monitoring pressure may play a role in pushing managers to seek 
strategic alternatives to maximize shareholder value. Despite the robust literature on the role of activists 
and managerial ownership on reducing agency costs, I cannot conclude that activist ownership or that 
insider ownership distinguishes firms that seek strategic alternatives, since statistically significant 
differences are not found for neither SA_DISC nor SA_LEAK. 
The univariate tests of differences in means do not control for other confounding sources of 
heterogeneity; for example, many of the firm characteristics are related to firm size. Therefore, 
multivariate evidence is provided by the probit regressions. Probit regressions utilize only the well-
populated variables to preserve sample size. Variables that may pose multicollinearity problems with 
other variables are excluded: ASSETS and CASH, as seen in the correlation matrix (Table 3).  
Table 4 Panel A presents the results of modeling the probability of disclosing strategic 
alternatives (SA_DISC). Column 1 presents the results of estimation while controlling for demand for 
M&A targets in industries experiencing consolidation; column 2 presents the marginal effects; column 
3 presents the results of estimation with fixed effects; and column 4 presents the marginal effects. Panel 
B presents the results for modeling media leaks of strategic alternatives (SA_LEAK). Results are 
generally consistent with the univariate analyses. First, I highlight the differences between the probit 
SA_DISC and SA_LEAK results; then, I highlight their common determinants. Firms that voluntarily 
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disclose strategic alternatives are smaller, have lower growth prospects (higher BTM), and weakly lower 
market beta. The McFadden pseudo R2 of the SA_DISC model is 7.7% without fixed effects or 8.4% 
with fixed effects. The untabulated likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-square test statistic, which tests that all the 
parameters in the model are simultaneously equal to zero, is 365.3 or 544.7, for the specification with or 
without fixed effects. To compare, Powell’s (1997, Table 3) main probit model has a McFadden pseudo 
R2 of 1.49% without fixed effects, and Palepu (1986, Table 3) reports likelihood ratio (LR) Chi-squared 
test statistics between 47.78 and 72.32. 
In contrast, in Panel B, firms with media leaks of strategic alternatives are larger, have weakly 
higher intangibles, but are not distinguished from peers by their BTM nor market beta. The McFadden 
pseudo R2 of the SA_LEAK model is 11.6% without fixed effects and 13.4% with fixed effects. 
Consistent with the interpretation of the univariate analyses partitioning on SA_DISC and SA_LEAK, 
these probit results reveal the roles of voluntary disclosure and media leaks serving different types of 
firms. 
What both groups of firms seeking strategic alternatives have in common are higher leverage, 
lower changes in earnings and revenues, lower prior stock returns, and higher blockholder ownership. 
The common determinants of seeking strategic alternatives provide evidence that a general motive for 
selling firms is to resolve their financial problems, consistent with the target bankruptcy avoidance 
hypothesis of Pastena and Ruland (1986) and Amit, Livnat, and Zarowin (1989). The debt overhang 
problem, while it may reduce agency costs, is nonetheless a threat to the firm’s stand-alone vitality, so 
greater leverage is a contributing factor. This financial problem appears to be compounded by the fact 
that these firms do not have promising core operations, measured by changes in earnings and revenues, 
for an operational turnaround as a stand-alone company and thus leads these firms to seek a strategic 
solution. Their negative prior stock returns also reflect this negative sentiment. The presence of golden 
parachutes and blockholders appear to be effective corporate governance mechanisms in getting these 
firms to take action by reviewing strategic alternatives. By volitionally taking the first step of the M&A 
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sale process, these firms are exhibiting self-discipline when faced with financial and performance issues 
in the presence of good corporate governance qualities. In contrast to the disciplining theory of mergers 
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988), a novel interpretation of this evidence suggests that poorly 
performing firms do not need an acquirer to be disciplined; rather, they appear to discipline themselves 
by seeking strategic alternatives. 
5.2 Determinants of receiving a bid (Research question 2) 
In this subsection, results uncover what firm characteristics are associated with a higher 
probability of receiving bids. The subsequent tests start with the 1,137 observations that seek strategic 
alternatives (SA=1), and identify the distinguishing attributes between those that receive bids 
(BID1YR=1) versus those that do not (BID1YR=0). 
Table 5 presents univariate t-tests, partitioning on BID1YR. Firms receiving bids have higher 
market capitalizations, greater growth prospects (lower BTM), and less cash. Although they have less 
cash, this potential need for cash provides an opportunity for a buyer to step in and provide capital 
resources to a target firm that otherwise has promising operations and investments in place. They have 
stronger operating performance, exhibited by ∆EARN, REV, CFO, and ACC. The core operations of 
actual target firms are better, and they have higher investments in operating assets. Firms that are viewed 
favorably by the stock market are more likely to be actual targets: they have less market risk and better 
prior stock price returns. Finally, actual targets have greater blockholder ownership than non-targets. 
 When controlling for multiple firm antecedents, Table 6 presents findings that are generally 
consistent with the univariate findings. Firms with better growth opportunities, changes in earnings 
(weak significance), and cash flows from operations have a greater probability of receiving a bid. Market 
beta is decreasing and blockholder ownership is increasing in the probability of receiving a bid. Within 
the full set of specified firm attributes, market capitalization, revenues, and prior stock returns appear to 
not have a significant effect on the selection of bid recipients. The McFadden pseudo R2 of this model 
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is 7.3%, or 7.9% when additionally controlling for the three-day announcement or media leak return 
(3DAYRET). 
 The announcement return at the time of the disclosure or media leak (3DAYRET) provides an 
opportunity to control for “unobservable” characteristics that the market observes. The market reaction 
prices in the estimated gains from a takeover, more specifically, the likelihood of a takeover and the 
premium to stockholders. When 3DAYRET is included in the model, it is statistically significant as 
expected; the positive and significant coefficient on 3DAYRET shows that the market partially prices the 
likelihood of receiving a bid in the future at the time of the disclosure or media leak. Yet, the coefficient 
estimates on the previously-specified firm attributes are generally unchanged, except ΔEARN is no 
longer statistically significant. The pseudo R2 increases modestly to 7.9%. The modest changes provide 
confidence that there is no serious correlated omitted variable problem.  
5.3 Two processes within one broadly-defined target selection process 
The self-selection to seek strategic alternatives and the selection of target firms to receive bids 
appear to be two distinct selection processes that prior papers have entangled. For the most part, the 
determinants of the two processes are distinctly different. While firms seeking strategic alternatives are 
relatively unhealthy firms, those that receive bids are relatively healthier and appear more promising. 
The only two firm attributes that explain both the probability of seeking strategic alternatives 
and the probability of receiving bids appear to be less cash (univariate evidence only) and greater 
blockholder ownership (univariate and multivariate evidence). Cash is excluded from the probit analyses 
due to strong correlations with other regression covariates. Nonetheless, the univariate evidence is 
consistent with desperate firms with less cash needing to seek a strategic out, and also presenting an 
opportunity for bidders to provide needed cash resources to an otherwise promising target. Blockholder 
presence is not only increasing the probability of seeking strategic alternatives, but is also higher in firms 
that subsequently receive a bid. One interpretation of the results is that blockholders monitor and provide 
pressure to managers and directors at the onset of the preliminary sale process, to start evaluating 
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strategic alternatives, and further along the sale process. Managers and directors may be pressured by 
large institutional investors to schedule and pursue management meetings with potential bidders until 
one or more offers are received. These findings are consistent with institutional shareholders advocating 
for maximizing shareholder wealth via strategic alternatives and also seeking to ensure that a bid is 
received. 
To provide evidence that the takeaways from my study could not be inferred from modeling 
takeover targets that receive a bid in one step, a probit equation models BID1YR on firm covariates in 
Table 7. This test also provides confidence that the results in previous tables are not due to this paper 
using different industries and years in my sample, but from using firms seeking strategic alternatives, 
which is conceptually different from firms that receive bids and whose takeovers are complete.  Like my 
previous probit tests, I include fixed effects to difference out potential correlated omitted variables that 
are fixed for industries and years (e.g., market conditions and demand for consolidation). This analysis 
is subject to the named concerns of prior literature, yet the purpose of it is to show that using a sample 
of strategic alternatives to model two selection processes provides different empirical insights than using 
a sample of ex-post targets to model one selection process; the new insights are not due to using a 
different sample period or variations of variable calculations compared to prior papers. Column 1 shows 
that target firms compared to non-targets in the same industry-years have are more undervalued (greater 
BTM), have greater financial constraints (higher LEV), do not have statistically different cash flow 
performance (CFO) and market risk (BETA). As in prior literature, the evidence is not conclusive about 
the role of profitability or performance; the coefficient on the accrual component of earnings (ACC) is 
negative while the coefficient on earnings growth (ΔEARN) is positive. 
The takeaways gained from separately modeling the two processes suggest that we observe 
desperate target firms receiving merger bids not because bidders prefer to acquire firms with lower 
growth prospects and higher leverage, but because firms with lower growth prospects and higher 
leverage are more likely to seek strategic alternatives! Making inferences solely from Table 7 would 
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cause one to conclude that cash flow performance and market risk are not important explanatory 
variables, whereas the cleaner research design in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that bidders appear to prefer 
firms with greater cash flows and lower market risk based on Table 6. Finally, target firms have 
significantly greater external institutional ownership (BLOCKHOLDER) than non-targets, and this is 
likely because institutional ownership is an important determinant for the target firm at both stages: 
when it’s seeking strategic alternatives and when it receives a bid. While I cannot statistically compare 
pseudo R2s across tables using different samples, it is nonetheless interesting to note that the pseudo R2 
of the one-step model in Table 7 (2.2%) is much smaller than the pseudo R2s from modeling the two 
processes separately in Tables 4 and 6 (range 7.7-13.4% and 7.3-7.9%, respectively). 
5.4 Robustness check using a modified peer comparison sample 
A limitation of my sample construction is that I can only identify a finite number of firms that 
are seeking strategic alternatives, whereas ideally, I would be able to identify all of them. Some firms 
that seek strategic alternatives but whose reviews are not publicly observable will be miscategorized into 
the respective peer comparison group (SA_DISC=0 and/or SA_LEAK=0). While having undercover SA 
firms in the comparison group is likely to lessen any differences between the observed SA group and 
comparison group and hence, understate my results, nonetheless, I conduct an alternate estimate of 
differences in firm attributes using the modified comparison samples. I remove all targets of friendly 
bids from the peer group, because presumably these firms could have been seeking strategic alternatives 
without being publicly observed. Then, I repeat the analysis in Table 2 using this modified peer group 
(untabulated), and results are consistent. Minute changes include the difference in INTAN between 
voluntary disclosers (SA_DISC=1) and their modified peer group, which becomes more significant (p-
value=0.049). The difference in REV between medial leaked companies (SA_LEAK=1) and their 
modified peer group becomes less significant (p-value=0.111); and the difference in ACTIVIST becomes 





The strategic alternatives sample provides a different perspective from which to analyze 
prospective targets’ motives for engaging in M&A. Analyzing firms that seek strategic alternatives tells 
us something new about potential target firms, including those that do not become actual targets, by 
receiving a bid. In contrast to prior studies that describe the characteristics of targets that receive a bid 
(e.g., Hasbrouck, 1985) or of targets of completed deals (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Morck, Schliefer, and 
Vishny, 1988, 1989), this study identifies the attributes of firms that announce that they are seeking to 
be acquired, regardless of whether a bid is received. Then, from the sample of firms seeking strategic 
alternatives, this study identifies the distinguishing attributes of firms that do receive bids. 
A limitation of the ex-post target samples used by prior studies is that they are unlikely to solely 
reflect target motives for M&A because they also reflect bidders’ selections of targets. Studying targets 
of completed deals introduces a sample bias from comingling the selection of targets (both self-selection 
and by buyers) with the selection by regulators and shareholders (for shareholder approval). In contrast, 
the observed choice to undergo a review of strategic alternatives reflects the pure volition of the selling 
firm, in the absence of any acquirer’s motive. The first main contribution of this study is exploiting the 
unique sample of firms seeking strategic alternatives to uncover the antecedent attributes of the typical 
firm that wants to be sold, including those that fail to receive a bid. 
The second main contribution is to model the broadly-defined “target selection” process as two 
distinct selection processes, following two research questions. The first research question is why certain 
firms seek strategic alternatives. Based on the common determinants of both disclosed and leaked 
strategic alternatives, the typical firm that is seeking strategic alternatives has financing and liquidity 
constraints (such as greater leverage and intangibles, but less cash) and lower operating performance. 
Yet the presence of golden parachutes and greater institutional ownership also increases the probability 
of seeking strategic alternatives. Taken together, firms seeking strategic alternatives appear to be firms 
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that face financial and liquidity problems, have bleak expectations of an operational turnaround, but 
have effective corporate governance in place to push the managers and directors to action. 
Due to the identification of firms seeking strategic alternatives through two different sources 
(voluntary corporate disclosures and media leaks), differences between firms using the two information 
channels can be analyzed to understand the different roles of voluntary disclosure and involuntary media 
leaks in transmitting information. Firms that disclose their strategic reviews tend to be smaller, less 
visible firms that need to publicly address their poor performance with a public announcement. On the 
other hand, firms that have their strategic reviews leaked have higher visibility within the analyst 
investment community and have greater market capitalizations.  
The second research question addresses why certain firms that explore strategic alternatives are 
successful and actually receive bids. Firms that receive bids have greater growth opportunities and past 
operating performance. They have less cash, but this does not appear to deter bidders, and may actually 
provide an investment opportunity for bidders. Lower market risk also increases the probability of a bid, 
suggesting that this is a desirable attribute of targets. Lastly, blockholder ownership increases the 
probability of receiving a bid. The influence of external blockholders at both stages of the process 
supports that notion that large shareholders improve the efficiency of the market for corporate control 
and this is one channel through which they improve firm value (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Modeling both selection processes using a common set of firm attributes contributes to the 
literature’s extant interest in the characteristics of target firms and refines our understanding of target 
selection. I show that the differing firm attributes that are important factors at each of the two selection 
processes (self-selection for strategic alternatives and selection to receive a merger bid) cannot be 
uncovered by modeling targets versus non-targets in one step. Moreover, the finding of a generally non-
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APPENDIX 1 (continued on the next page) 
 
Examples of Firms Seeking Strategic Alternatives 
 
Panel A: Angie’s List, Inc.’s media leak 
 




By Myles Udland  
  
October 1, 2014 
 
Shares of Angie's List were up as much as 22% in pre-market trade on Wednesday after a report by The 
Financial Times' Ed Hammond said the company has hired bankers to, "help it explore strategic options, 
including a possible sale of the business."  
 
Angie's List in an online review service, sort of like Yelp, but requires members to register and pay a 
yearly fee for the service.  
 
Earlier this week, Angie's List announced a new $85 million credit agreement with TCW Asset 
Management. 
 
Year-to-date, shares of Angie's List, which has been the subject of negative commentary from short-
selling blogs like Citron Research in the past, are down 57% excluding Wednesday's pre-market rally. 
 






APPENDIX 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Conn’s, Inc.’s corporate disclosure 
 




October 6, 2014 
 
Conn's, Inc. (NASDAQ:CONN), today announced that its Board of Directors authorized management 
to explore a full range of strategic alternatives for the Company to enhance value for stockholders, 
including, but not limited to, a sale of the Company, separating its retail and credit businesses or slowing 
store openings and returning capital to investors. The Company has engaged BofA Merrill Lynch as 
financial advisor and Vinson & Elkins LLP as legal counsel to assist in the process. 
 
"Our strategic initiatives remain on track with new store openings and the penetration of new geographic 
markets, and we remain committed to our current strategic plan," stated Theodore M. Wright, Conn's 
chairman and chief executive officer. "We are extremely proud of what our Conn's team has 
accomplished. While we remain confident in the Company's future prospects and have ample capital 
and liquidity to execute our business plan, we have decided to conduct a strategic review and explore 
options to accelerate the realization of value for our stockholders," said Mr. Wright. 
 
Mr. Wright further noted, "We remain fully committed to continuing to meet the needs of our customers, 
attracting and retaining world-class talent, driving sales and operating margins, executing our store 








Strategic alternatives indicator variables 
SAi,t =1 if firm i is seeking strategic alternatives in year t, identified by its 
corporate disclosure or a media leak, and =0 for its peer firms in the 
same FF 48 industry-year. A firm with both leaked and disclosed 
strategic alternatives is only counted once. 
SA_LEAKi,t =1 if firm i is seeking strategic alternatives in year t, identified by a 
media leak, and =0 for its peer firms in the same FF 48 industry-year. 
SA_DISCi,t =1 if firm i is seeking strategic alternatives in year t, identified by its 
corporate disclosure, and =0 for its peer firms in the same FF 48 
industry-year. 
Receipt of a bid indicator variable 
BID1YRi,t =1 if firm i is seeking strategic alternatives and receives a bid within 
one year. =0 if firm i is seeking strategic alternatives but does not 
receive a bid. 
Fundamentals 
ASSETSi,q Total assets of firm i at the most recent quarter-end q before the 
corporate disclosure or media leak. Source: Compustat 
MKVALi,q Market value of firm i’s common equity at the most recent quarter-end 
q, calculated as PRCC_F * CSHO. Source: Compustat 
MTBi,q Market-to-book ratio of firm i at the most recent quarter-end q, 
calculated as market value of common equity divided by the book 
value of common equity. Source: Compustat 
LEVi,q Leverage of firm i at the most recent quarter-end q, calculated as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. Source: Compustat 
CASHi,q Cash and cash equivalents of firm i at the most recent quarter-end q 
before the corporate disclosure or media leak, scaled by total assets. 
Source: Compustat 
INTANi,q Intangible assets of firm i at the most recent quarter-end q before the 
corporate disclosure or media leak, scaled by total assets. Source: 
Compustat 
ΔEARNi,q Year-over-year change in quarterly earnings, calculated as NIi,q + 
XINTi,q – (NIi,q-4 + XINTi,q-4), divided by average total assets. Source: 
Compustat 
REVi,q Quarterly sales revenue of firm i for the most recent quarter q before 
the corporate disclosure or media leak, calculated as total revenues 
divided by average total assets. Source: Compustat 
CFOi,q  Quarterly cash flows from operations of firm i for the most recent 
quarter q before the corporate disclosure or media leak, scaled by 
average total assets. Source: Compustat 
CFIi,q  Quarterly cash flows from investing activities of firm i for the most 
recent quarter q, calculated as IVNCF scaled by average total assets. 
Source: Compustat 
ACCi,q  Quarterly operating accruals of firm i for the most recent quarter q, 
calculated as (ΔAT – ΔCHE) – (ΔLT – ΔLCT – ΔDLT), divided by 
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average total assets. Source: Compustat 
EMPGRi,y Annual change in number of employees at the most recent year-end y 
before the corporate disclosure or media leak, calculated as (EMPi,y – 
EMPi,y-1) / EMPi,y-1. Source: Compustat 
Market and Analyst 
BETAi,y CAPM beta estimated at the firm-year level using monthly 
observations of firm i’s returns during years y-2, y-1, and y, where at 
least 10 observations are required for estimation: 
(ݎ݁ݐ௜,௠ − ݎ௠
௙) = ߙ௜,௠ + ߚ௜,௬൫ݎ௠௠௞௧ − ݎ௠
௙൯ + ߝ௜,௠ 
Source: CRSP and Ken French’s website 
RETi,y 12-month market-demeaned buy-and-hold returns ending with the 
month prior to the corporate disclosure or media leak. 12-month buy-
and-hold CRSP value-weighted returns over the same period are 
subtracted. Source: CRSP 
EPSFORECASTi,m Consensus analysts’ forecasted EPS growth for firm i at month m, 
calculated as (consensus EPS estimatei,m – actuali,m-12) / actuali,m-12. 
Source: IBES Estimates 
NUMANALYSTSi,m Number of analysts following firm i at month m, calculated as the 
number of earnings forecasts used in determining the consensus 
estimate for fiscal year earnings. Source: IBES Estimates 
Manager 
MANAGERFEi,m Managers’ forecast error, calculated as (manager’s EPS forecasti,m – 
actual EPS) / actual EPS. Source: IBES Guidance 
|MANAGERFEi,m| Absolute value of managers’ forecast error. Source: IBES Guidance 
PARACHUTEi,m Presence of golden parachute provision. Source: Risk Metrics 
Governance 
Ownership 
BLOCKHOLDERi,m Institutional blockholders’ ownership as a percent of shares 
outstanding, by asset managers with $100+ million AUM and 5%+ 
ownership, for firm i at the end of the most recent month m before the 
corporate disclosure or media leak. Source: Thomson Reuters 
Institutional Holdings 
ACTIVISTi,m Activists’ ownership as a percent of shares outstanding, from 13-D 
filings for firm i at the end of the most recent month m before the 
corporate disclosure or media leak. Source: Audit Analytics 
INSIDERi,m Insiders’ shares held in firm i at the end of month m, as a percent of 
shares outstanding. Insiders are the CEO; Chairman of the Board; 
Director; CFO; General Counsel; Partner; Director and Beneficial 
Owner; Officer Director and Beneficial Owner; Officer and Director; 
and Vice Chairman. Source: Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data 
Other 
3DAYRETi,t The 3-day buy-and-hold return surrounding the corporate disclosure or 
media leak date. Source: CRSP 
DEMANDi,y Proxy for demand for consolidation in firm i’s industry and year y, 
calculated as the number of acquired firms in that FF48 industry-year 
divided by the number of firms in that FF48 industry-year. Source: 












Notes: This exhibit summarizes the various samples and subsamples used by the literature to describe 
target selection. The arrows on the right show the comparisons that prior studies have made. The two 
arrows on the left show the two selection processes described in this paper. This conceptual 
representation of target selection would not apply to hostile takeovers, which are rare in my post-1990 
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Industry and Year Distributions 
 
Panel A: Industry distributions of firms seeking strategic alternatives and their peer firms 
 
 
Panel B: Year distributions of firms seeking strategic alternatives and their peer firms 
 
 
Notes: Panel A depicts the Fama-French 12 distributions of firms that seek strategic alternatives (SA=1) 
identified by corporate disclosures and media leaks (black bars), their peer firms before balancing 
industries and years (patterned bars), and the peer firms after balancing (grey bars). Panel B depicts the 
year distributions. Peer firms (SA=0) are selected from the same FF 48 industry years as the SA=1 
observations. Entropy balancing assigns a weight to each peer observation so that the peer group’s 






Antecedent Characteristics of Firms Seeking Strategic Alternatives vs. Their Peers 
 




























Notes: This figure presents the mean values of selected quarterly and monthly antecedent firm characteristics before the strategic alternatives 
event date. The solid line represents the strategic alternatives group (SA=1) and the dashed line represents the industry-and-year-balanced peer 





Antecedent Characteristics of Firms that Receive Bids vs. Firms that Do Not Receive Bids 
 




























Notes: This figure presents the mean values selected quarterly and monthly antecedent firm characteristics before the strategic alternatives event 
date. The solid line represents the observations in the strategic alternatives group that receive bids (SA=1 & BID1YR=1) and the dashed line 





Sample and Subsamples 
 
 




















Observations that receive 
bid(s) within one year 
SA_DISC=1 & BID1YR=1 
 
Observations that receive 
bid(s) within one year 
SA_LEAK=1 & BID1YR=1 
 
 
Observations that receive 
bid(s) within one year 












Observations that receive 
bid(s) within two years  
SA_DISC=1 & BID2YR=1 
 
Observations that receive 
bid(s) within two years  
SA_LEAK=1 & BID2YR=1 
 
 
Observations that receive 
bid(s) within two years  












Notes: This table describes the sample and pertinent subsamples used in this study. Of the 1,006 
corporate disclosures (SA_DISC=1) and 151 media leaks (SA_LEAK=1), 20 observations experience 




TABLE 2 (continued on the next page) 
 
Firms that Seek Strategic Alternatives vs. Their Peers 
 
Panel A: Firms seeking strategic alternatives identified by corporate disclosures versus their industry-year peer firms 
 Firms seeking strategic alternatives 
Corporate disclosures 




 N Mean  
(a) 
SD Median N Mean  
(b) 
SD Median P-value 
(a) ≠ (b) 
     Fundamentals          
ASSETSi,q 1,006 1,112 3,556 215 67,355 3,225 13,174 268 *** 
MKVALi,q 1,006 597 1,739 113 67,355 2,155 6,800 217 *** 
BTMi,q 1,006 0.794 0.857 0.627 67,355 0.610 0.622 0.480 *** 
LEVi,q 1,006 0.570 0.282 0.563 67,355 0.525 0.276 0.517 *** 
CASHi,q 1,006 0.152 0.205 0.061 67,355 0.183 0.229 0.079 *** 
INTANi,q 1,006 0.085 0.169 0.000 67,355 0.075 0.154 0.000 * 
∆EARNi,q 1,006 -0.014 0.082 -0.002 67,355 0.000 0.072 0.001 *** 
REVi,q 964 0.248 0.216 0.197 57,931 0.271 0.228 0.220 *** 
CFOi,q 1,006 -0.003 0.073 0.007 67,355 0.006 0.066 0.011 *** 
CFIi,q 1,006 -0.013 0.059 -0.008 67,355 -0.023 0.067 -0.011 *** 
ACCi,q 1,006 -0.008 0.105 -0.000 67,355 0.012 0.098 0.007 *** 
EMPGRi,y 950 0.084 0.470 0.000 59,037 0.136 0.451 0.041 *** 
     Market          
BETAi,y 1,006 1.123 1.000 0.993 67,355 1.167 1.030 1.035 . 
RETi,y 1,006 -0.213 0.529 -0.283 67,355 -0.006 0.612 -0.083 *** 
EPSFORECASTi,m 581 0.238 1.607 0.091 35,062 0.406 1.495 0.154 ** 
NUMANALYSTSi,m 658 4.941 4.880 3.000 40,820 6.692 6.396 4.000 *** 
     Manager          
MANAGERFEi,m 334 0.834 1.899 0.119 20,553 0.406 1.459 0.002 *** 
|MANAGERFEi,m| 334 0.959 1.893 0.219 20,553 0.598 1.482 0.111 *** 
PARACHUTEi,m 161 0.789 0.409 1.000 12,930 0.662 0.473 1.000 *** 
     Ownership          
BLOCKHOLDERi,m 847 0.170 0.157 0.141 51,061 0.136 0.142 0.099 *** 
ACTIVISTi,m 378 0.181 0.182 0.113 16,542 0.189 0.219 0.098 . 
INSIDERi,m 800 0.092 0.178 0.019 54,040 0.115 0.206 0.026 *** 
42 
 
Panel B: Firms seeking strategic alternatives identified by media leaks versus their industry-year peer firms 
 Firms seeking strategic alternatives 
Media leaks 




 N Mean  
(a) 
SD Median N Mean  
(b) 
SD Median P-value 
(a) ≠ (b) 
     Fundamentals          
ASSETSi,q 151 6,385 19,526 1,642 20,583 5,306 19,024 478 . 
MKVALi,q 151 2,534 3,248 1,515 20,583 3,290 9,372 370 *** 
BTMi,q 151 0.542 0.534 0.430 20,583 0.630 0.670 0.481 ** 
LEVi,q 151 0.601 0.254 0.589 20,583 0.551 0.290 0.529 ** 
CASHi,q 151 0.174 0.187 0.103 20,583 0.226 0.252 0.115 *** 
INTANi,q 151 0.206 0.231 0.092 20,583 0.137 0.194 0.029 *** 
∆EARNi,q 151 0.002 0.045 0.000 20,583 0.002 0.073 0.000 . 
REVi,q 135 0.229 0.186 0.172 14,264 0.256 0.216 0.200 * 
CFOi,q 151 0.015 0.055 0.016 20,583 0.005 0.065 0.009 ** 
CFIi,q 151 -0.015 0.033 -0.010 20,583 -0.018 0.061 -0.009 . 
ACCi,q 151 0.009 0.074 0.004 20,583 0.007 0.085 0.004 . 
EMPGRi,y 149 0.069 0.235 0.026 17,965 0.091 0.333 0.030 . 
     Market          
BETAi,y 151 1.248 0.919 1.156 20,583 1.208 0.954 1.096 . 
RETi,y 151 -0.046 0.454 -0.103 20,583 0.021 0.553 -0.047 * 
EPSFORECASTi,m 140 0.059 1.115 0.066 12,070 0.289 1.443 0.119 ** 
NUMANALYSTSi,m 145 11.283 7.583 10.000 13,876 7.586 6.948 5.000 *** 
     Manager          
MANAGERFEi,m 88 0.389 1.380 0.012 6,976 0.388 1.409 0.000 . 
|MANAGERFEi,m| 88 0.476 1.366 0.088 6,976 0.560 1.440 0.099 . 
PARACHUTEi,m 72 0.833 0.375 1.000 4,090 0.753 0.431 1.000 * 
     Ownership          
BLOCKHOLDERi,m 141 0.223 0.149 0.210 16,350 0.161 0.151 0.130 *** 
ACTIVISTi,m 80 0.147 0.171 0.094 8,319 0.184 0.213 0.096 * 
INSIDERi,m 141 0.066 0.154 0.010 16,547 0.085 0.159 0.020 . 
Notes: Panel A presents summary statistics for firms that disclosed strategic alternatives (SA_DISC=1) and their FF 48 industry-year peers (SA_DISC=0). Panel B 
presents summary statistics for firms that experienced leaked strategic alternatives (SA_LEAK=1) and their FF 48 industry-year peers (SA_LEAK=0). The right-most 
column in each panel presents t-tests of the differences in means between the two groups. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 








Notes: Pearson pairwise correlations are presented on the upper right, and Spearman rank pairwise correlations are presented on the lower left. 
See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. *** indicates correlations significant at the 1% level. Correlation coefficients with magnitudes greater 
than 0.25 are bolded. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) ln(MKVALi,q) 
 
-0.28*** 0.04*** -0.06*** 0.22*** 0.01*** -0.13*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.18*** -0.01 0.68*** 0.19*** -0.18*** 
(2) BTMi,q -0.28*** 
 
-0.05*** -0.18*** -0.06*** -0.01*** -0.05*** 0.06*** -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.20*** -0.06*** -0.15*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 
(3) LEVi,q 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 
-0.47*** -0.05*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.01*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 
(4) CHEi,q -0.03*** -0.27*** -0.48*** 
 
-0.08*** -0.01 -0.21*** -0.28*** -0.07*** 0.03*** 0.25*** 0.05*** -0.02*** -0.06*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 
(5) INTANi,q 0.27*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.04*** 
 
0.02*** -0.06*** 0.08*** -0.00 -0.03*** 0.09*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.14*** 0.19*** -0.10*** 
(6) ΔEARNi,q 0.07*** -0.09*** -0.01*** 0.01 0.02*** 
 
0.08*** 0.11*** 0.16*** -0.09*** 0.02*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 
(7) REVi,q -0.11*** -0.06*** 0.08*** -0.14*** 0.01 0.15*** 
 
0.22*** 0.02*** -0.00 -0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.15*** 
(8) CFOi,q 0.28*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.12*** 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 
 
-0.15*** -0.03*** -0.10*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 
(9) ACCi,q 0.10*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 0.15*** 0.04*** -0.22*** 
 
0.15*** -0.01*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.01*** -0.01 0.04*** 
(10) EMPGRi,y 0.13*** -0.17*** -0.11*** 0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.19*** 
 
0.04*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 -0.03*** 0.06*** 
(11) BETAi,y 0.12*** -0.16*** -0.18*** 0.26*** 0.11*** 0.02*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.01*** 0.04*** 
 
0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.03*** 
(12) RETi,y 0.28*** -0.22*** 0.02*** -0.00 0.08*** 0.22*** 0.07*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.05*** -0.05*** 
 
0.17*** 0.03*** -0.01 0.04*** 
(13) EPSFORECASTi,m -0.01 -0.15*** -0.03*** 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.38*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.25*** 
 
-0.02*** -0.00 0.03*** 
(14) NUMANALYSTi,m 0.68*** -0.21*** 0.01 0.01 0.15*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.23*** 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.02*** 
 
0.03*** -0.15*** 
(15) BLOCKHOLDERi,m 0.26*** 0.01 -0.09*** 0.04*** 0.18*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.13*** -0.01 0.00 0.11*** 0.03*** -0.01 0.13*** 
 
-0.16*** 




TABLE 4 (continued on the next page) 
Modeling the Probability that the Firm Seeks Strategic Alternatives 
 
Panel A: Strategic alternatives identified by corporate disclosures 
 Dependent variable = SA_DISCi,t 
 Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.113  N/A due  
 (0.897)  to F.E.  
     
ln(MKVALi,q) -0.121*** -0.044 -0.131*** -0.047 
 (-6.950)  (-6.653)  
     
BTMi,q 0.119*** 0.044 0.134*** 0.049 
 (5.169)  (5.349)  
     
LEVi,q 0.620*** 0.226 0.631*** 0.228 
 (6.199)  (5.719)  
     
INTANi,q 0.277 0.101 0.309 0.112 
 (1.518)  (1.294)  
     
ΔEARNi,q -0.784*** -0.286 -0.842*** -0.305 
 (-3.221)  (-2.944)  
     
REVi,q -0.411*** -0.150 -0.354** -0.128 
 (-2.642)  (-2.226)  
     
CFOi,q -0.213 -0.078 -0.337 -0.122 
 (-0.600)  (-1.043)  
     
ACCi,q -0.259 -0.094 -0.320 -0.116 
 (-1.239)  (-1.484)  
     
BETAi,y -0.046* -0.017 -0.046* -0.017 
 (-1.699)  (-1.674)  
     
RETi,y -0.248*** -0.090 -0.251*** -0.091 
 (-4.476)  (-4.852)  
     
BLOCKHOLDERi,m 1.132*** 0.413 1.217*** 0.441 
 (9.303)  (8.963)  
     
DEMANDi,y 2.814*** 1.026 N/A due  
 (2.863)  to F.E.  
     
Sample Observations that disclosed strategic alternatives (SA_DISC=1) and their industry-year 
peers (SA_DISC=0) 
Fixed effects  No  FF 12 & year  
Clustered SEs FF 48 & year  FF 48 & year  
Industry & year balancing Yes  Yes  
Observations 44,248  44,248  





Panel B: Strategic alternatives identified by media leaks 
 Dependent variable = SA_LEAKi,t 
 Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -2.274***  N/A due  
 (-7.117)  to F.E.  
     
ln(MKVALi,q) 0.203*** 0.071 0.239*** 0.081 
 (4.100)  (4.300)  
     
BTMi,q 0.062 0.021 0.014 0.005 
 (0.531)  (0.112)  
     
LEVi,q 0.623*** 0.216 0.498** 0.169 
 (3.440)  (2.369)  
     
INTANi,q 0.251 0.087 0.729* 0.248 
 (0.748)  (1.696)  
     
ΔEARNi,q -0.977** -0.339 -0.896** -0.304 
 (-1.979)  (-2.176)  
     
REVi,q -0.424* -0.147 -0.308 -0.105 
 (-1.783)  (-0.875)  
     
CFOi,q 0.273 0.095 0.066 0.023 
 (0.348)  (0.094)  
     
ACCi,q 0.337 0.117 0.276 0.094 
 (0.591)  (0.364)  
     
BETAi,y -0.023 -0.008 0.004 0.001 
 (-0.330)  (0.051)  
     
RETi,y -0.204 -0.071 -0.263* -0.090 
 (-1.569)  (-1.917)  
     
BLOCKHOLDERi,m 1.539*** 0.533 2.011*** 0.684 
 (4.320)  (4.424)  
     
DEMANDi,y 8.407*** 2.914 N/A due  
 (5.038)  to F.E.  
     
Sample Observations with leaked strategic alternatives (SA_LEAK=1) and their industry-year 
peers (SA_LEAK=0) 
Fixed effects  No  FF 12 & year  
Clustered SEs FF 48 & year  FF 48 & year  
Industry & year balancing Yes  Yes  
Observations 11,317  11,269  
McFadden pseudo R2 0.116  0.134  
Notes: This table presents probit regressions explaining the incidence of seeking strategic alternatives using firm attributes. 
Voluntary corporate disclosures of strategic alternatives (SA_DISC) is the dependent variable in Panel A. and media leaks of 
strategic alternatives (SA_LEAK) is the dependent variable in Panel B. The number of observations used in regressions is 
lower than the number of observations in the univariate analyses due to requiring non-missing variables. Standard errors are 
clustered by FF 48 industry and year. Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 





Firms that Receive vs. Do Not Receive Bids 
 
 Firms seeking strategic alternatives 
that receive bids 
Firms seeking strategic alternatives  
that do not receive bids 
Difference in 
means 
 N Mean  
(a) 
SD Median N Mean  
(b) 
SD Median P-value 
(a) ≠ (b) 
     Fundamentals          
ASSETSi,q 497 1,926 9,101 323 640 1,591 6,850 226 . 
MKVALi,q 497 928 1,996 190 640 725 2,038 126 * 
BTMi,q 497 0.675 0.641 0.586 640 0.828 0.948 0.601 *** 
LEVi,q 497 0.582 0.263 0.576 640 0.565 0.292 0.555 . 
CHEi,q 497 0.144 0.188 0.062 640 0.165 0.215 0.071 * 
INTANi,q 497 0.099 0.182 0.000 640 0.099 0.182 0.000 . 
∆EARNi,q 497 -0.005 0.063 -0.000 640 -0.018 0.089 -0.003 *** 
REVi,q 468 0.265 0.213 0.211 614 0.229 0.209 0.178 *** 
CFOi,q 497 0.009 0.058 0.015 640 -0.008 0.079 0.005 *** 
CFIi,q 497 -0.014 0.049 -0.010 640 -0.013 0.061 -0.007 . 
OPACCi,q 497 0.001 0.076 0.002 640 -0.012 0.116 -0.002 ** 
EMPGRi,y 474 0.059 0.387 0.008 606 0.102 0.491 0.000 . 
     Market          
BETAi,y 497 1.009 0.925 0.885 640 1.239 1.036 1.149 *** 
RETi,y 497 -0.134 0.490 -0.178 640 -0.238 0.547 -0.317 *** 
EPSFORECASTi,m 347 0.271 1.379 0.094 355 0.127 1.616 0.073 . 
NUMANALYSTSi,m 391 6.294 5.940 4.000 393 5.623 5.694 4.000 . 
     Manager          
MANAGERFEi,m 186 0.651 1.616 0.057 225 0.774 1.870 0.104 . 
|MANAGERFEi,m| 186 0.762 1.582 0.156 225 0.901 1.883 0.194 . 
PARACHUTEi,m 121 0.793 0.407 1.000 104 0.808 0.396 1.000 . 
     Ownership          
BLOCKHOLDERi,m 491 0.188 0.156 0.159 479 0.167 0.158 0.134 ** 
ACTIVISTi,m 193 0.171 0.177 0.104 254 0.179 0.185 0.109 . 
INSIDERSHARESi,m 419 0.078 0.165 0.013 503 0.096 0.183 0.022 . 
Notes: This table presents the antecedent characteristics of firms that receive versus do not receive M&A bids, from the sample of 1,137 firms that are seeking 
strategic alternatives (SA=1). The right-most column presents t-tests of the differences in means between the two groups. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 





Modeling the Probability that the Firm Receives a Bid 
 
 Dependent variable = BID1YRi,t 
 Coefficients Marginal Effects Coefficients Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(MKVALi,q) 0.026 0.010 0.018 0.007 
 (0.767)  (0.539)  
     
BTMi,q -0.096* -0.035 -0.116** -0.042 
 (-1.649)  (-1.960)  
     
LEVi,q -0.012 -0.004 -0.019 -0.007 
 (-0.057)  (-0.087)  
     
INTANi,q -0.230 -0.084 -0.218 -0.080 
 (-0.623)  (-0.562)  
     
ΔEARNi,q 1.133* 0.417 1.026 0.374 
 (1.684)  (1.386)  
     
REVi,q 0.428 0.158 0.420 0.153 
 (1.472)  (1.458)  
     
CFOi,q 1.284** 0.472 1.060* 0.387 
 (2.314)  (1.832)  
     
ACCi,q 0.146 0.054 0.069 0.025 
 (0.303)  (0.138)  
     
BETAi,y -0.119*** -0.044 -0.110** -0.040 
 (-2.597)  (-2.371)  
     
RETi,y 0.101 0.037 0.081 0.030 
 (0.944)  (0.726)  
     
BLOCKHOLDERi,m 0.658* 0.242 0.625* 0.228 
 (1.862)  (1.711)  
     
3DAYRETi,t   0.673** 0.246 
   (2.131)  
     
Sample Observations seeking strategic alternatives (SA=1) 
Fixed effects  FF 12 & year  FF 12 & year  
Clustered SEs FF 48 & year  FF 48 & year  
Observations 920  920  
McFadden pseudo R2 0.073  0.079  
Notes: This table presents results from probit regressions of an indicator variable, BID1YR, which =1 if the firm received 
a bid within one year, on firm attributes. The intercept is not presented due to the inclusion of fixed effects. The number 
of observations used in regressions is lower than the number of observations in the univariate analyses due to requiring 
non-missing variables. Standard errors are clustered by FF 48 industry and year. Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. See 





Modeling the Probability that the Firm Receives a Bid from the Population 
 
 Dependent variable = BID1YRi,t 
 Coefficients Marginal Effects 
 (1) (2) 
ln(MKVALi,q) -0.035*** -0.006 
 (-3.098)  
   
BTMi,q 0.054* 0.009 
 (1.803)  
   
LEVi,q 0.170*** 0.028 
 (2.886)  
   
INTANi,q 0.276** 0.046 
 (2.347)  
   
ΔEARNi,q 0.234*** 0.039 
 (2.592)  
   
REVi,q -0.003 -0.000 
 (-0.033)  
   
CFOi,q -0.238 -0.040 
 (-0.962)  
   
ACCi,q -0.479*** -0.080 
 (-5.259)  
   
BETAi,y -0.020 -0.003 
 (-1.398)  
   
RETi,y 0.008 0.001 
 (0.592)  
   
BLOCKHOLDERi,m 0.581*** 0.096 
 (8.327)  
   
Sample SA=1 observations and their SA=0 industry-year peers 
Fixed effects  FF 12 & year 
Clustered SEs FF 48 & year 
Observations 46,153 
McFadden pseudo R2 0.022 
 
Notes: This table presents results from the probit regression of an indicator variable, BID1YR, which =1 if the firm 
received a bid within one year, on firm attributes. The intercept is not presented due to the inclusion of fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by FF 48 industry and year. Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. See Appendix 2 for variable 
definitions. Instead of only using the SA=1 observations as in the previous table, this table uses the SA=1 and SA=0 
observations. 
